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Future-Making and Frictional Mobility in the Return of 
Burmese Migrants
Prasert Rangkla
► Rangkla, P. (2019). Future-making and frictional mobility in the return of Burmese migrants. Austrian 
Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 12(1), 17-30.
This article explores the experiences of recent returnees from Thailand to Southeast 
Myanmar and the complicated landscape of their future-making. In looking at the ar-
duous journeys of Burmese migrants both in Myanmar and Thailand, I discuss how 
economic and political developments in reform-era Myanmar have informed Burmese 
migrants’ idea of return migration. Seeking a better life through coming home, they have 
encountered factors of friction and traction that either support or impede their plans. 
Accordingly, I argue that the return of these Burmese workers has become frictional mo-
bility rather than a straightforward return. Ethnic politics and land boom in the region 
have intensified social inequality and conflicts that eventually make the organization 
of return more complex. The situation allows migrants to settle in their home country, 
postpone the return, and continue shuttling at the border while using the pattern of 
movement as a livelihood.
Keywords: Burmese Migrants; Future-Making; Mobility; Myanmar; Return Migration

INTRODUCTION
The recent reforms in Myanmar (or Burma) since President Thein Sein’s gov-
ernment (2011-2016) have significantly changed the country’s conditions. The 
political democratization increasingly promotes optimistic views about the fu-
ture, particularly in light of the general elections in 2010 and 2015 (Lall, 2016). 
The country has received an increase in technical and financial assistance from 
foreign governments and international agencies. Myanmar’s economy is grow-
ing rapidly, with a GDP annual growth rate of 6-8% during the period between 
2012 and 2016 (Asian Development Bank, 2017). The positive economic situa-
tion of this period appeals to foreign investment and general commerce. At the 
individual level, people are more willing to spend money on daily consumption 
and property acquisition. A larger variety of commodities and services are avail-
able to Burmese people at local markets. Regional and international trade and 
other economic transactions boost Myanmar’s overall economic performance. 
Some Burmese who once experienced displacement from political suppression, 
civil war, and economic underdevelopment are making the decision to go back 
to Myanmar and become part of these seemingly promising changes. 
Traveling back to one’s country of origin is known as ‘return migration’ in 
academic literature. Much attention has been paid to the patterns and push-pull 
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factors of return migration (Gashi & Adnett, 2015; Hirvonen & Lilleør, 2015). Major 
pull factors that attract migrant workers to return include the improvement of socio-
political conditions and the increased economic opportunities in the home coun-
try. At the same time, push factors of the receiving countries, such as high costs of 
living and xenophobia, also motivate migrant workers to return. Migrant workers 
keep watching the social and institutional situations in their countries of origin. 
According to Cassarino (2004), migrant workers often intend to stay abroad tempo-
rarily and have prepared their return migration plans, including migration duration 
and savings target. They also anticipate how their skills and financial resources could 
be put to good use in the country of origin. 
A number of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand express their intention to 
return to their own country in the long run. Recent socio-economic developments 
in Myanmar, including foreign direct investment, deregulation, and public servic-
es improvement, persuade many Burmese to return. Better job opportunities and 
political stability are major pull factors for return migration. According to Mya Thet 
& Pholphirul (2016, p. 1012), investment opportunities have a greater influence on 
Burmese migrant workers’ return than job availability or wages. Workers do not 
want to go back and just work in low-wage jobs. Even though economic, especially 
employment, prospects are improving, wage and working conditions at home are still 
significantly inferior. They rather prefer to run their own business upon return than 
look for jobs. With greater job opportunities in Thailand, many Burmese workers 
thus remain and continue to work there in order to accumulate enough savings to 
start their own business in Myanmar. They remain outside the country, watching and 
waiting for the right time to return.
However, studies that emphasize macro-level analysis pay little attention to the 
actual experience of return migration. This article argues for the necessity to take the 
experience of movement seriously, as also suggested by mobility studies (Hannam, 
Sheller, & Urry, 2006). According to Cresswell (2010), mobility is not simply a ‘free 
flow’, but is channeled and sometimes stopped through friction or resisting forces. 
Instead of assuming a linear movement, this article asks how returnees to Southeast 
Myanmar experience, make sense of, and organize their return. How does the 
complex scenario of a long-stunted, now growing, yet still limited economy effect 
Burmese migrants’ decisions and future-making?
This article forms part of a qualitative research project entitled “Future and 
Possibility of Life: A Study of Burmese Migrants and Temporality”. Data collection 
includes literature review, participant observation, and in-depth interviews with 
approximately 30 key informants, both in Thailand and Myanmar. Fieldwork was 
conducted for three months in 2017 in Southeast Myanmar (Myawaddy, Hpa-an, and 
Mawlamyine) and for another three months in 2018 in Thailand (Prachuap Kirikhan 
province). My key informants were mainly identified and contacted through a snow-
ball technique. Although their ethnic backgrounds are diverse – Karen, Burmese, 
Mon, and Pa-O – this article refers to them as Burmese in order to emphasize their 
shared experience of the national reform and transformation. I interviewed some 
key informants who are small business owners in Myanmar and some who remained 
in Thailand with enthusiasm for the return. Most of them once fled the protracted 
civil war and economic underdevelopment under the Burmese military governments 
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and have worked long-term in Thailand. Although real town and village names are 
retained here, I use pseudonyms for all interviewees’ names to guarantee anonymity. 
At the beginning, the article reviews the pull factors or the opportunities that 
encourage Burmese workers to return to their home country. The article continues 
with an ethnographic vignette illustrating how the return of a Burmese worker has 
been shaped by expectations of the future, which is referred to here as “future-making” 
(Kleist & Jansen, 2016). It then explains the factors of friction that have impeded 
and slowed down Burmese return mobility. The subsequent two sections explore 
Myanmar’s land boom, which has become a boon for some returnees and a barrier 
for others, and the consequential upsurge of social inequality. Finally, the article 
argues that the complex landscape of Myanmar in transition both helps and impedes 
Burmese migrants’ future-making through return, allowing them to either settle, or 
postpone the return, or even continue shuttling across the Thai-Myanmar border. 
RETURN WITH ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS 
Southeast Myanmar has experienced an economic boom after the policy reforms 
since 2011, evident in the growing import-export trade and development of new in-
frastructure. The cross-border trade between Thailand and Myanmar has increased 
substantially. The merchandise export values at the Mae Sot (Thailand)-Myawaddy 
(Myanmar) border crossing point have jumped from less than USD 1 billion in 2011 
to USD 2.1 billion in 2015. A large number of people in Myanmar have benefitted 
from the country’s open economic policy. Many research informants are doing busi-
ness by relying on imported commodities from Thailand, for example, food supplies 
for restaurant owners; tools and equipment for hairdressers, mechanics, and techni-
cians; clothes and sports equipment for shopkeepers. Another factor underlying this 
growth is infrastructure investment. In the study area, a new, better-quality road was 
constructed, which officially opened in September, 2015, linking the Burmese eastern 
borderland to other commercial cities. 
Business opportunities in the newly-open economy are, however, limited. 
Crumbling infrastructure and military cronies’ influence in politics and business 
impose constraints on commercial investment and commodity production (Chia, 
Aung, & Shawng, 2016). Consequently, recent Burmese returnees’ businesses focus 
only on basic services and small-scale trade. Burmese returnees choose to make a 
living in three different categories of business. First, many provide shipping and 
transport services. While logistic services facilitate linking the cross-border trade 
between Thailand and Myanmar, passenger transport has become a public service to 
travelers, including those migrants moving out of the country to work in Thailand. 
Second, some returnees work in the construction sector and property agencies, such 
as construction materials shops and land brokerage. Finally, many earn their living in 
the service sectors. These include hair and beauty salons, tea and coffee shops, food 
and beverage shops, groceries, clothes-selling shops, chicken-raising farms, video 
recording services, remittance services, and betel nut vending. 
Notably, these new business-operators can be seen as small-scale entrepreneurs. 
Their stories sound intriguing, especially their alertness with regard to and their 
navigation of Myanmar’s political-economic changes. Many observed the political 
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transformations in Myanmar while they worked as paid laborers abroad. They then 
discovered profit opportunities hitherto unnoticed – the ability that Israel Kirzner 
(1997) defined as “entrepreneurship”. Their present lives and future possibilities 
are re-examined by their constant observations. Some try out pilot businesses in 
their home country, and, if these go well, eventually pursue this venture. Their 
re-engagement with Myanmar-in-transition shapes their new experiences. They 
learn about the economic gaps that they can fill to earn their livelihoods. For exam-
ple, food-shop owners know what their customers want to eat at affordable prices, 
and clothing shop-owners know their customers’ taste in clothing fashions. Their 
entrepreneurial acuity keeps them monitoring trends and so re-conceptualizing their 
own opportunities back home. 
To realize the economic opportunities in Myanmar, these individual returnees 
rely on three kinds of capital. The first and most important one is financial capital, 
or their savings. The money serves to materialize their business ideas. Some types 
of enterprises, such as chicken-raising farms, require a large sum of money, initially 
and for maintenance. Since it is virtually impossible to get a loan in Myanmar, sav-
ings are so crucial and become the main source to fulfill entrepreneurial plans. The 
second kind of capital is the technical expertise gained and practiced while working 
abroad. The knowledge of mechanics, technicians, hairdressers, and culinary workers 
can be transformed into career opportunities. The final type of capital is knowledge 
of business management. Some returnees were self-employed while they were living 
in Thailand. They understand the management of rental spaces, procurement, mate-
rial storage, staff employment, and customer services. With these kinds of capital, 
returnees have the potential to pursue their post-displacement projects.
These returnees’ alertness to opportunity cannot be analyzed without taking into 
account existing socio-political conditions. Becoming an entrepreneur is not a pre-
determined expectation of individuals, as conventionally discussed. Their recognition 
of, creation of, and initiative to seize opportunities are linked with multiple struc-
turing factors (Gough, Langevang, & Namatovu, 2013, p. 298). The more relaxed 
political atmosphere in Myanmar, for example, has had a profound impact on return-
ees’ decisions, providing basic freedom and everyday security. Burmese people are 
able to travel around and to earn their living without fear of being persecuted. Town 
residents confirm that travelling at night has become safer compared to the past. 
Burmese returnees see major urban towns as places of commercial opportunity, 
because they represent transport hubs, having better basic infrastructure and large 
numbers of clients. Many Burmese emigrants, thus, do not return to their homes in 
rural areas of Karen State and Mon State. Going back to Myanmar therefore means 
earning their living in commercial towns. They invest different kinds of capital to 
pursue the economic opportunities there.
FUTURE-MAKING IN RETURN
To return to Myanmar and survive with a small-scale business has attained specific 
significance in Southeast Myanmar, where emigration has been common for decades. 
Narratives of economically-possible return create hope about a future life at home 
for many Burmese working abroad. Recent returnees have expressed their desire to 
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be able to make a living in Myanmar. They seek economic opportunities to enable 
them to sustain their return. Hope plays a major role in future-making. Hope pos-
es a temporal landscape that becomes a palimpsest of the past, present, and future, 
with varying intensity. In hope, there is “a wish for a change that cannot be effectu-
ated in the moment” (Dalsgård, 2014, p. 99). Kleist and Jansen (2016) suggest that 
anthropologists should investigate hope “as it occurs in concrete social settings and 
geo-political-moments” (p. 374). 
Imagining the future has been an important element of Burmese returnees’ life, 
also for Jor Hoe and his wife who returned to Myanmar in late 2013. The couple 
was very optimistic about the possibility of living in transitioning Myanmar. In 
Thailand, they had worked in a factory producing stereo speakers for 13 years but 
left the workplace due to internal conflict. Jor Hoe did not return to his home village 
near Mawlamyine, but went to a border town in Karen State, named Myawaddy. He 
co-invested with a younger brother in opening a shop repairing exhaust pipes for cars 
and motorcycles. His brother worked in an automotive garage with an uncle for five 
years. As he planned to start his own business, he asked Jor Hoe to join in. The latter 
believed that his brother had experience in the business, so he chose to move there. 
They rented a building in a good location, close to a bus station and a road junction. 
A former garage owner sold them a set of mechanic equipment at a low price. Since 
the opening, Jor Hoe has tried hard to make the business profitable and to adapt to 
the economic forces that prevail in the country.
For a newcomer, running a business inevitably involves difficulties. The shop 
initially had only a small number of customers. The brothers turned to accepting 
different jobs involving metal and steel welding to expand their services with existing 
tools. However, they still had to cope with the high costs of financing the building 
lease. The rent costed them about USD 1,700 every six months, and the whole sum 
had to be paid in advance. In late 2014, they found that they could share the build-
ing for commodity storage, which alleviated some of their rent burden. Both of their 
wives also helped out by running a food and tea shop in the building. Jor Hoe himself 
found other ways to increase his income, such as providing motorcycle taxi services 
and finding customers to rent a car owned by another younger brother. 
Jor Hoe’s striving under the conditions of transitioning Myanmar has been shaped 
by the ongoing infrastructure developments and economic growth in Southeast 
Myanmar. Myawaddy, the present location of Jor Hoe’s business, has been bustling 
with cross-border trade with Thailand. The increasing commerce required more 
transport and passenger vehicles that eventually increased the brothers’ potential 
customer base. The poor and limited infrastructure in the region is also gradually 
upgraded. The construction of a new road replaced a one-way road winding across 
steep mountains. It helped ease traffic congestion between Myawaddy and other 
Burmese cities, facilitating logistics and passenger transport. Another new Thailand-
Myanmar border-crossing bridge is also under construction. As soon as the bridge is 
opened, border trade and other economic activities between the two countries are 
expected to flourish. 
Running a business in Maywaddy appears to be a good decision, yet living in 
Myanmar’s transition period entails an inevitable uncertainty. Jor Hoe’s planned 
return to Myanmar is still far from achieving a financially secure life. After a year 
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and a half, he and his wife took different jobs for their economic survival. They have 
put a lot of effort into struggling with existing conditions. Their hope for a better 
life is based on their striving practices. Jor Hoe took any paid jobs related to metal 
and steel welding. He sometimes asked his skilled father to help him with certain 
kinds of work he could not do by himself. He anticipated that his small shop could be 
turned into a garage, seeing the town’s booming economy. Jor Hoe’s wife co-invested 
with her sister in selling second-hand appliances. Furthermore, she persuaded her 
husband that opening a cheap plastic utensil shop is a promising business, as none of 
this type exists in the region.
The story of a Burmese returnee, like Jor Hoe, demonstrates the effort to “modify 
or customize various aspects of our temporal experience and resist external sources 
of temporal constraints and structure” (Flaherty, 2011, p. 3). Their ideas about the 
future determine how they act in the present moment. However, the success of their 
efforts is not guaranteed. In the case of Jor Hoe, his 18-month experience in returning 
and running a small business was confronted with challenges and setbacks. The low 
number of customers hampered his hopes and realization of commercial success. His 
garage had insufficient income for the high rental costs. According to latest informa-
tion, Jor Hoe’s joint business collapsed, and he started earning money from a small 
vending stall in the same town. The following section investigates why future-making 
projects like his have had limited chance of success in contemporary Myanmar. 
ENCOUNTERING FRICTION
Future-making, can be a naïve projection of a better life if it ignores what is actually 
happening on the ground. Returning to Myanmar-in-transition, Burmese migrants 
inevitably face challenges and uncertainty against the background of two distinct 
processes: Myanmar’s new economic prosperity, which has been described earlier, 
and flawed peace-building endeavors. The latter comprises Myanmar’s peace pro-
cess during the period between 2012 and 2015, during which the National Ceasefire 
Agreement (NCA) between the Myanmar government and different armed ethnic 
groups was reached. The NCA mitigated armed fighting in Southeast Myanmar. 
The pacification provided personal safety and overall security. However, the peace 
agreement provides no guidance regarding the surrender of weapons and armed 
group dissolution. Subsequently, rare incidents of low-intensity fighting continue to 
have negative effects on daily routines and economic activities. A group of Burmese 
returnees in Myawaddy complained that their inter-town shuttle service was some-
times suspended during tense periods. When the conflict settled down, it took a few 
days before passenger transportation and shipping could return to its normal levels.
Large areas of Karen State in Myanmar have been under the dynamic influence of 
armed conflict between the Burmese army and the Karen insurgent group. Internal 
conflicts within the latter led to the formation of small Karen factions whose rela-
tionships with the Burmese government are discretely structured by different nego-
tiations (for details on Karen’s internal fragmentation, see Gravers & Ytzen, 2014). 
All Karen armed groups initially reached a ceasefire agreement and finally signed a 
peace agreement with the government in 2015. While all groups remained armed, the 
government gave them unofficial authority over particular territories in Karen State. 
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The quasi-autonomous zones have high potential for future economic investment. 
These are, for example, around Myawaddy, which is the border gate to Thailand, 
and around Hpa-an, Karen State’s capital, where many new economic projects have 
recently been launched.
Personal economic interests have been integral to the flawed peace process. The 
Burmese government awards lucrative assets to Karen armed groups who signed 
the peace agreement, increasing their local influence. Their political power is thus 
closely bound to their economic power, especially in the selling of imported second-
hand cars and property development. Their local influence includes owning specific 
plots of land near highways, controlling the assigned land and community living on 
that land, gaining access to business licenses, authorizing mining concessions, and 
smuggling merchandise. When different Karen groups and the Burmese army claim 
authority over the same resource sites, competition leads to shootings and other 
armed battles. Recently, most conflicts have been related to contested resource con-
trol between different groups, including Burmese authorities. 
The decision whether to return to Myanmar is thus also based on an evaluation of 
political circumstances in the region. Different interest groups can take an active role 
in shared political authority. Some leaders of Karen armed groups can take control 
over any movements in their own areas. Returnees living in Myawaddy and other 
major economic centers in Southeast Myanmar inadvertently confront difficulties 
caused by such political dynamics. 
This article argues that the Burmese return trajectory is under the influence of 
‘friction’. Friction, a physical force of resistance, is also a social and cultural phenom-
enon that is experienced as one is, for example, stopped while driving through a 
city, or encounters suspicion at check-ins at international airports (Cresswell, 2014). 
Friction may slow down movement, or impede it. Inaction, slowness, congestion, and 
blockage result when people, things, and ideas ‘rub’ against each other. Friction then 
implies particular kinds of uneven power arrangements in human movements. 
The return of Burmese to Myanmar has unavoidably become a ‘frictional mobil-
ity’, as it rubs against other entities and their movements. In the post-military era, 
different groups have mobilized towards reaching different ends: State agencies and 
locally influential persons have accelerated several economic development projects. 
Leaders of armed groups have been influential players in certain businesses. At the 
very least, their actions disturb, slow down, or impede Burmese workers’ movement 
and mobility. 
TRACTION AND LAND BOOM 
Friction, as explained above, does not only impede the possibility and potential of mo-
bility but also enables particular forms of traction. The domination of armed group 
leaders in Karen State is far from completely obstructive to mobility. Traction appears 
through the booming trend in private land acquisition in the areas under study. A 
‘land rush’ is especially evident in Myawaddy, where money-making is comparatively 
much easier than in other places in Southeast Myanmar. The town itself has been 
the transit point of human, commodity, and financial flows between Myanmar and 
Thailand. Burmese from elsewhere as well as Burmese migrants in Thailand move to 
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this town with the hope of being able to take advantage of economic opportunities. 
The land transaction boom in Myawaddy and other nearby towns takes place at 
two different markets. The first market is land acquisition for investment and other 
commercial purposes. Another one appears among small-scale land buyers for gen-
eral housing. Commanders of different Karen armed groups oversee land supplies for 
both markets. Some groups who have prevailed in the area since the 1990s occupy 
vast, scattered areas. Some locations were previously used as military posts; other 
plots are deforested areas claimed after the end of a timber concession. Recently, the 
size of Myawaddy town substantially expanded towards forest-cleared areas. Land 
plots along the Asian Highway No. 1 rank as first priority for business investors, and 
are usually overpriced. Karen commanders built new dirt roads linking occupied land 
to the main roads. Some sites even provide basic facilities, such as water, electricity, 
and a drainage system. It is then divided into small plots that are sold for house con-
struction. The land market targets ordinary Burmese, especially those with savings 
from working abroad. A number of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand bought 
these plots of land with expectations for future use.
The land boom underlines the key role of ethnic armed groups at the Thailand-
Myanmar border. During the past four decades, they have sought to control the 
cross-border movement of people and commodities. Their capacities have waxed and 
waned through different political periods (Smith, 1999; South, 2008). After the county 
opened up, they became informal agents selling land to Burmese emigrants. During 
the period between 2013 and 2015, the number of emigrants buying land around 
Myawaddy increased significantly. Plot sizes offered by developers vary, depending 
on and responding to purchasing capacities. The smallest land parcel is the most pop-
ular one, 40 feet by 60 feet. Its price ranges from USD 1,400 to USD 3,000, depending 
on location, facilities, and speculated profit potential. The preferred transaction is 
in Thai baht. The owner can build a small house in a given area, with some leftover 
vacant space. Certain estate sites turn into residential communities, with a number of 
home owners, grocery shops, and sometimes Buddhist monasteries. However, some 
developed sites are still unoccupied, equipped with no basic facilities except for a 
paved road. The developers have done no more than clear and fence the land with 
pillars and barbed wire.
When visiting a new neighborhood at the northern fringe of a town named Thit 
Ta Ping (which means single tree in English), one can notice more than 30 houses that 
have recently been constructed, while some others are still in the process of building. 
The origins of its residents are diverse. Most bought land in the community follow-
ing the word-of-mouth of friends and relatives who had been there. Thit Ta Ping is a 
good example of a successful estate development in high demand. It is situated just 
4 km north from the current center of Myawaddy and close to many infrastructure 
projects planned for construction, such as the second Thailand-Myanmar Friendship 
Bridge and a new wet market. Many Burmese emigrants with financial capital are 
interested in buying land there, as the location is forecast for urban expansion and 
business opportunities. Walking out of the community to the west, one will also 
find vacant plots of land. A Karen fellow explained that all of them belong to private 
owners. They bought them for future opportunities and their economic potential, 
although many of them still work elsewhere.
ASEAS 12(1) | 25
Prasert Rangkla
Thit Ta Ping is a land allocation project initiated by a vice-commander of Division 
999 of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), which has now been trans-
formed into the Border Guard Force (BGF). Its initial phase started in 2008, aiming 
at the housing demands of ordinary Burmese. It drew more attention and activity 
when the open economic policy was launched and a ceasefire signed between the 
Karen insurgent group and the Myanmar government. These plots of land have since 
then become housing land for recent returnees. Some Burmese even operate their 
business there, such as grocery stores, noodle shops, and small-scale manufacturing. 
Notably, all of these transactions are carried out without legal documents related 
to private land tenure rights. The buyers only get certificates signed by local leaders 
who actually work under the BGF commander’s supervision. These informal papers 
possess no legal validity in Myanmar. They are merely guarantee documents from the 
ethnic armed groups, and buyers have to put their trust in the sellers. 
The close encounters between Burmese returning for projects related to liveli-
hood and armed groups’ influence have not prevented or stopped further human 
movement. The friction simply causes delays in some moving practices and enables 
mobility within other particular social contexts. Burmese emigrants have seen the 
opportunities of land access and possession and other affiliated benefits in economi-
cally booming towns. Many returnees materialize their dreams of returning home 
through different channels. They purchase land parcels, build houses, and earn a liv-
ing there. These dwellers then tell their siblings and friends who still work in Bangkok 
to grasp the opportunity too. The latter usually make a short visit to check out the 
situation and buy the land offered to them. Some buyers may have no idea of what to 
do next. If someone else then makes them an offer to buy the land, they are willing to 
sell it for a lucrative profit. While some returnees invest in their future through land 
acquisition, what is the impact of the current land situation on the region and future 
opportunities of return migration?
UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF HOPE
The land rush illustrates how frictional mobility impedes the future-making of 
Burmese returnees. The setting of Myawaddy and neighboring areas brings about 
speculative land transactions and expensive land prices. The increasing demand for 
land pushes prices too high for easy acquisition. Some land parcels change hands very 
quickly, with the price increasing each time the parcel is resold. When a land owner 
earns a big profit from a land deal, the neighbors usually increase the value of their 
own land parcels too. The owners of vacant land nearby also put it up for sale. Every 
land owner takes advantage of the boom for greater profit margins.
This land speculation has profound social consequences for the Burmese commu-
nity and the choices of those who plan to return in the near future. First, the business 
strengthens the influence of ethnic armed groups who have not disarmed follow-
ing the 2015 nationwide peace agreement. The commanders of ethnic armed groups 
become the real beneficiaries of the land boom. The development of their estates 
brings them greater wealth. The earned money is spent on their own investments 
and certainly on increasing their armaments. This entails a re-invigoration of their 
political control. The social and political relations in Karen State are transforming 
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along considerably complicated patterns. The ethnic armies have become strong 
contestants to government power. It will be difficult to transform them into civil-
ian entities. Future return to Myanmar is inevitably confronted with their mafia-like 
influence. 
Another consequence is the emergence of new land dealers and their specula-
tive schemes. Ordinary Burmese become land agents, selling land plots for big profit 
without producing anything valuable. The lucrative financial benefits lure them to 
participate in this activity. Some of them earn a lot of money and spin speculations 
further. The story of Ti Wa Shu, a Karen returnee living in Myawaddy, demonstrates 
this well. He came back to Myanmar without regular employment in early 2013. He 
bought a 6 ac plot of land around Thit Ta Ping for housing and small-scale farming, 
as a revered Buddhist monk had advised him to do. A year later, another land-seeker 
bought half of his land, by paying him five times the amount he had paid for the 
whole parcel. He sold another quarter of the land for a profit in 2015. He planned to 
do future speculation by forming a partnership with another three friends to buy a 
large land plot. They thought that if the future Burmese economy continued to grow, 
their investment would yield them great profit when selling the land later. 
The situation in Myawaddy shows early returnees fulfilling their dreams of the 
future at the expense of more recent returnees. As noted by Ghassan Hage (2016), 
there is an unequal distribution of hope, as certain Burmese acquire more profit 
potential than others. Land speculation, as in the case of Ti Wa Shu, along with 
the economic growth, generates the problem of overpricing. For those who return 
and buy land and a house, future-making in Myanmar is much more promising and 
secure than for poor emigrants with less financial capability. The latter find it difficult 
to resettle in Myanmar. New allocated land plots are so expensive that they cannot 
afford them with their savings. The speculation business has explicitly mitigated the 
possibility of realizing their hopes in their return. 
The pursuit of future possibilities creates not only economic but also political 
uncertainties and daily pressures that become constitutive of more complicated 
relations in Southeast Myanmar. The flawed peace arrangements and strengthened 
local armed groups increase risks for future returnees. When interest groups like 
these interrupt the general business climate through their local domination, ordi-
nary Burmese wishing to do business there might have to reconsider their dream of 
enjoying the seemingly flourishing economy of Myanmar-in-transition. Intervention 
by these armed groups or small flare-ups of fighting can undermine their capacity 
for profit-making. Land allocation projects have facilitated the hopes of some, but 
the politics of hope now point to uncertainty and exploitation. Land speculation has 
contributed to the escalation of social inequality among the Burmese and negatively 
affected the probability of the future return of Burmese emigrants.
TOWARDS COMPLEX MOBILITY
The Burmese return phenomenon from Thailand brings about enthusiasm for 
a future life in Myanmar. In local communities, stories of returning become impor-
tant narratives. People talk about successful and failed cases of returnees with great 
enthusiasm. They admire certain outstanding returnees who have demonstrated 
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economic endurance. As a matter of fact, only a small number of Burmese emigrants 
can attain such an achievement back in their homeland. For example, in Taunggalay, 
a Karen village near Hpa-an, a group of villagers praised a Burmese named Jor La Thu 
who was good at money-making. The man is an agent buying and selling second-
hand cars imported from Japan through the border with Thailand. He has become a 
role model who knows well how to use entrepreneurial skills to earn money, despite 
little financial capital. His career path draws further conversation, as he co-invested 
with a friend and bought a second-hand tractor which he hires out for field plowing. 
Many landowners in the village use his services in order to clear weeds and bushes 
on their farmland.
Those who remain outside Myanmar closely observe what happens to their friends 
who have returned. For Burmese migrants in Thailand, going back to Myanmar even-
tually becomes a necessity when they get old. The stories of the future carried by 
recent returnees to Myanmar have significantly shaped the hopes of the Burmese 
working abroad. These Burmese migrants ought to be seen not only as migrant work-
ers, but also as subjects who make their own dreams about what the future holds, 
based on the transformations taking place back in Myanmar. Burmese migrants in 
Thailand not only think of returning home; some even engage in the return experi-
ment. Yet, there are a lot of uncertainties and unequal distribution of resources and 
hope in Myanmar. 
The overall situation encourages Burmese migrants to embark on a return 
experiment before returning indefinitely. During my interview with Jor La Thu, 
Taunggalay’s appraised businessman, he introduced me to one of his friends, Ma 
Cho. She is a married Mon woman, who was 50 years old. At that time, Ma Cho and 
her husband took a three-week leave to visit Ma Cho’s family in Hpa-an. Her parents 
escaped fighting and moved from a rural Mon village to the town in the mid-1980s. 
In the early 1990s, Ma Cho and her husband moved to work as undocumented work-
ers in Thailand, due to unemployment at home. The couple had four children. The 
two older sons worked with the parents in Thailand, while the other two ones were 
with their grandmother in Hpa-an. In Thailand, they have been employed in differ-
ent kinds of work in the fishery industry. In the meantime, Ma Cho also has her own 
small business. She buys and dries cuttlefish’s black ink-like deposit and sells it to 
animal feed production mills.
Ma Cho thinks about future return to Myanmar, but she does not know how to 
survive economically there. Two years ago, Ma Cho bought five wooden houses on 
scattered plots from neighbors in her family’s community. She rents out dilapidated 
shanties there to rural migrants who move to work in the town. During the trip, 
when I met her in Hpa-an, she decided to buy another land plot suggested by Jor La 
Thu. It is near the newly established industrial zone. She explained her decision to 
me:
Land plots are going to be more expensive. If I don’t get some today, it will 
be impossible to buy later. Land in my mother’s community is not suitable for 
business. It is a residential slum and is flooded in the rainy season. . . . I don’t 
know what to do with this new plot. I might run an ice-production site; there 
are quite a few ice sellers here.
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The couple’s wish to return has involved multiple moves in recent years. Ma Cho’s 
husband remained in Hpa-an after that visit. He planned to investigate the possibil-
ity of the return for the whole family. Later, he came back to stay with Ma Cho in 
Thailand. He found it was difficult to find ways to earn an income there. The follow-
ing year, Ma Cho herself went back to stay in Hpa-an for six months, and returned to 
Thailand with similar results. She found her hometown lacked opportunities to earn 
money, and her daily expenses were much higher than her income. She therefore 
postponed the timing of the return. Some of Ma Cho’s friends in her Burmese com-
munity in Prachuap Kirikhan, who once experimented with returning, have recently 
also shown less enthusiasm.
Some returnees take their re-engagement with Myanmar as a continuous move-
ment. A case in point is that of Tun Myint, an ethnic Pa-O man. Tun Myint returned 
from working in Bangkok in 2013 and started running a motorcycle repair shop. His 
shop also sold second-hand motorcycles and bicycles. He usually traveled to Thailand 
and looked for second-hand small pickup trucks. He bought one on each trip and 
took the vehicle to sell it in Myanmar. He could earn a good profit from the smug-
gling business. The trip usually took place in the monsoon season when his shop 
had only a few customers due to the heavy rain. Tun Myint is only one of many male 
returnees who live their lives on the move. They return to stay with their family in 
Myanmar but continue taking short trips back and forth for commodity smuggling. 
Imagining the future has driven Burmese migrants to spend their savings on 
investment and make an effort to realize their return to Myanmar. Their experiences 
of the situation on the ground have been an unpleasant reminder of the uncertainty 
and ambiguity of the future. The improved socio-economic situation they see stands 
against the pitfalls of the national peace-building process. While returning to their 
home country is largely anticipated by displaced Burmese people, the realization is 
far from a linear process of return migration. The ongoing political and economic 
dynamics in present-day Myanmar enforce particular patterns of return mobility, 
which are rather complex and uncertain. 
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have shown how the return of Burmese migrants from Thailand 
to Southeast Myanmar has been configured by the complicated landscape of hope 
and future-making. The economic and political transformations in the reform-era 
Myanmar have generated factors of friction and traction that either support or im-
pede the plan of homecoming and life-earning there. The Burmese return happens 
against the background of political reform, economic growth, and political influence 
of local armed groups. The return trajectory, in fact, experiences resisting forces, en-
gendered through the flawed peace process. Return then becomes frictional mobility 
rather than straightforward return migration. The contestation of political power 
disrupts the newly emerging economic opportunities in their homeland. Existing 
constraints push returnees to make more efforts on their return plan, or even recon-
sider it.
The overall situation in Southeast Myanmar shows that ethnic armed groups 
remain influential agents. Their control over land and active involvement in the 
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property business, along with the land acquisition of return migrants, aggravate 
the conflict and increase social inequality in the region. The land rush has greatly 
impacted Burmese society and return migration. The Karen armed groups are domi-
nant players in resource allocation for ordinary returnees, especially with regard to 
access to land and housing in Southeast Myanmar. Such business strengthens the 
financial and political power of these armed groups and the return opportunities of 
ordinary people grow more complicated. Contested political power intensifies the 
social inequality in Myanmar and further delays the probability of return for Burmese 
migrants from Thailand.
These circumstances bring about an unequal distribution of hope, allowing some 
Burmese to have greater access to resources than others. This article shows how 
their return mobility turns into a complex moving project. Hope for success of one 
person, through land investment, comes at the expense of the hopes of others. One 
thing should be noted here: The interest in returning to the home country is not a 
static idea, it may greatly intensify or attenuate over time. In the early years of open 
economic policies, Burmese migrants monitored actual changes at home and par-
ticipated in the flow of homeland re-engagement. They now increasingly recognize 
that there are many obstacles awaiting them there. While some Burmese struggle to 
realize the possibility of future lives in Myanmar, others are still reluctant to pursue 
the full project of return migration.
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